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Book	Review:	Philosophy	Within	its	Proper	Bounds
by	Edouard	Machery
In	Philosophy	Within	Its	Proper	Bounds,	Edouard	Machery	offers	a	new	manifesto	for	experimental
philosophy	as	a	counter	to	traditional	philosophical	methods.	In	advocating	the	need	for	a	modest	approach	to
philosophical	enquiry,	this	book	will	be	a	valuable	resource	for	those	wishing	to	engage	with	the	empirical
challenge	that	experimental	philosophy	claims	to	represent	and	shows	how	it	can	do	important	positive
philosophical	work,	recommends	James	Andow.	
Philosophy	Within	its	Proper	Bounds.	Edouard	Machery.	Oxford	University	Press.	2017.
Find	this	book:	
Experimental	philosophers	conduct	psychological
experiments	to	build	up	an	understanding	of	contributing
factors	when	we	make	judgments	about	philosophically
interesting	cases.	In	his	latest	book,	Philosophy	With	its
Proper	Bounds,	prominent	philosopher	Edouard	Machery
offers	a	new	manifesto	for	experimental	philosophy,	cast	in
the	light	of	a	naturalistic	approach	to	analysing	concepts.
In	the	book,	Machery	advocates	modesty	in	philosophy.
Immodest	philosophy	seeks	answers	to	questions	about
what	is	possible	and	what	is	necessary.	Many	traditional
approaches	to	philosophy	put	such	immodest	questions	at
the	core	of	the	discipline.	This	might	be	seen	to	help
philosophy	maintain	a	distinctive	identity,	as	it	allows
philosophers	to	stake	out	a	territory	in	which	scientific
methods	are	of	no	use.	If	Machery	is	right,	however,	not	only
are	scientific	methods	no	good	for	answering	immodest
questions,	but	standard	philosophical	methods	are	of	little
use	either.
Machery	argues	that	the	metaphysical	ambition	to	attain
modal	knowledge	(knowledge	about	what	is	possible	and
what	necessary)	is	largely	beyond	our	reach.	Instead,	the
modest	philosophy	Machery	advocates	is	naturalised
conceptual	analysis.	For	Machery,	concepts	are	complex
psychological	entities	which	we	aren’t	much	good	at
introspecting.	They	are	like	predictive	models	with	numerous
predictive	factors	that	may	have	various	weightings	and
might	interact	in	numerous	interesting	ways.	The	conceptual
analysis	Machery	advocates,	therefore,	‘is	not	your	grandfather’s	conceptual	analysis’,	which	might	have	taken
place	firmly	in	the	armchair.	Rather,	‘if	we	care	about	analysing	concepts	for	some	philosophical	purpose,	the
experimental	method	[…]	is	our	best	tool’	(244).	Naturalised	conceptual	analysis	can	make	the	implicit	structures
that	underpin	our	thinking	about	fundamental	things—like	responsibility,	justification	and	goodness—explicit	and
accessible.	We	can	expose	the	ways	that	our	concepts	lead	us	astray.	And	we	can	help	to	shape	our	concepts
for	future	use.
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Why	must	philosophy	be	modest?	Why	do	philosophers	need	to	kick	the	metaphysics	habit?	Why	does	Machery
think	the	quest	for	modal	knowledge	a	futile	one?	Part	of	Machery’s	picture	is	a	scepticism	about	the	only	method
philosophers	have	for	answering	immodest	questions:	the	‘method	of	cases’.		Using	this,	philosophers	aim	to
discover	the	nature	of	things	like	causation	and	knowledge	via	considering	and	reaching	verdicts	about	a	variety
of	hypothetical	examples	and	through	(frequently	bizarre)	thought	experiments.
The	relationship	between	experimental	philosophy	and	the	method	of	cases	has	gone	through	a	couple	of	stages.
In	the	early	days,	around	2001,	various	experimental	philosophers	argued	forcefully	that	because	our	judgments
about	cases	are	subject	to	demographic	and	presentational	effects,	the	method	of	cases	is	in	trouble.
Subsequently,	although	ongoing	attempts	to	assess	the	replicability	of	experimental	philosophy	suggest	it	is
pretty	decent,	some	of	the	findings	that	were	key	to	those	early	arguments—findings	of	cultural	differences
between	East	Asian	and	Western	participants—have	failed	to	replicate,	and	the	research	projects	of	experimental
philosophers	have	drifted	away	from	trying	to	make	trouble	for	the	method	of	cases.	Machery’s	book	should	be
seen	as	attempting	a	re-evaluation	of	the	current	state	of	play.
Machery	provides	a	detailed	up-to-date	review	of	a	vast	swathe	of	experimental	philosophy	literature.	Despite	the
fact	that	some	key	results	failed	to	replicate,	Machery	makes	clear	that	the	threat	to	the	method	of	cases	has	not
gone	away.	Collectively,	the	results	of	experimental	philosophy	show	that	judgments	about	key	philosophical
cases	in	epistemology,	ethics	and	philosophy	of	language	exhibit	large	effects	of	seemingly	irrelevant	factors,
such	as	the	gender	of	the	person	making	the	judgment	and	the	order	in	which	cases	are	presented.
This	challenges	the	method	of	cases	in	a	number	of	ways.	Most	obviously,	it	is	a	sign	that	the	judgments	are
unreliable.	Machery	thinks	this	is	no	accident.	There	is	a	tension	in	the	method	of	cases.	The	method	of	cases	is
employed	to	assess	the	modal	consequences	of	views	and	so	needs	to	distinguish	theories	that	agree	about
everyday	cases.	To	achieve	this	goal,	philosophers	must	consider	cases	that	are	radically	different	from
situations	we	encounter	in	real	life	and	that	pull	apart	aspects	of	cases	which	go	together	in	everyday	situations.
But	these	very	features	lead	to	unreliability.
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It	would	also	be	unacceptably	dogmatic,	thinks	Machery,	for	philosophers	to	react	to	the	extant	evidence—
interpreted	as	evidence	of	widespread	disagreement	among	epistemic	peers	about	philosophical	cases—to
continue	to	rely	on	their	own	judgments	about	philosophical	cases	(an	argument	hostage	to	the	success	of
conciliatory	views	of	peer	disagreement).	And,	Machery	argues,	it	would	be	unacceptably	parochial	for	philosophy
as	a	discipline	to	react	to	the	evidence—interpreted	as	the	result	of	widespread	differences	in	people’s
understanding	of	words	like	‘justified’	and	‘free’—by	simply	continuing	to	systematically	investigate	only	those
properties	that	philosophers	themselves	happen	to	refer	to	using	those	words	and	to	ignore	all	the	properties	that
so	many	others	on	this	planet	seem	to	think	important.
Chapter	Two	of	the	book	is	a	particularly	valuable	resource.	Machery	aims	to	give	‘as	complete	as	possible’	a
‘detailed	review	of	the	experimental	findings	about	the	factors	that	influence	judgments	elicited	by	philosophical
cases’	(44).	This	is	a	laudable	aim.	Polonioli	has	written	about	the	benefits	philosophers	could	reap	from
approaching	literature	reviews	in	a	systematic	way	and,	in	particular,	how	it	could	provide	some	guard	against
bias.	Unfortunately,	Machery	doesn’t	include	some	features	which	one	might	expect	from	a	systematic	literature
review.	The	precise	search	methods,	inclusion	and	exclusion	criteria,	amongst	other	aspects,	are	not	reported.	To
my	mind,	this	is	a	missed	opportunity	as	readers	are	left	with	a	limited	ability	to	assess	how	comprehensive	the
survey	is,	or	to	repeat	or	update	the	review	for	themselves.
I’d	also	have	appreciated	more	on	Machery’s	understanding	of	unreliability	and	when	it	is	a	problem.	On	page	96,
Machery	embraces	the	idea	that	reliability	isn’t	a	threshold	concept,	but	that	‘epistemic	standing	worsens	as
reliability	goes	down’.	However,	Machery	gives	a	few	pointers	here	and	there	which	suggest	a	fairly	precise
threshold	below	which	reliability	becomes	a	problem.	On	page	97,	it	is	clear	that	a	process	must	perform	better
than	a	random	process.	On	page	104,	Machery	makes	it	clear	that	77.5	per	cent	reliability	is	good	enough,	but	55
per	cent	is	not.	On	page	108,	Machery	cites	62.5	per	cent	as	low	enough	to	raise	concerns.	I	think	the	reader
really	needs	some	clearer	guidance	as	to	what	point	the	epistemic	deficiency	kicks	in,	in	order	to	assess	whether
the	evidence	presented	in	Chapter	Two	is	a	sufficient	inductive	basis	for	a	serious	challenge	to	traditional
philosophical	methods.
Philosophy	within	Its	Proper	Bounds	will	nonetheless	be	an	important	book	for	a	few	reasons.	One	is	that	it
represents	a	much-needed	go-to	resource	for	those	wishing	to	engage	with	the	empirical	challenge	that
experimental	philosophy	has	been	claimed	to	present	to	traditional	philosophical	methods.	Another	is	that	it	unites
various	pictures	of	experimental	philosophy.	It	presents	a	manifesto	for	an	experimental	philosophy	which	can	do
important	positive	philosophical	work	motivated	by	an	empirical	dissatisfaction	with	the	more	traditional	methods
and	aims	of	philosophy,	and	it	also	offers	a	picture	of	experimental	philosophy	as	an	empirical	cognitive	science
which	is,	by	the	same	token,	conceptual	analysis.
James	Andow	is	currently	Lecturer	in	Moral	Philosophy	at	the	University	of	Reading	and,	in	2018,	he	will	be
moving	to	the	University	of	East	Anglia.	His	research	includes	work	in	philosophical	methodology	and
experimental	philosophy.	You	can	read	about	his	research	at	his	personal	website:	www.jamesandow.co.uk.
Note:	This	review	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	the	LSE	Review	of	Books	blog,	or	of	the
London	School	of	Economics.	
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